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Nearly a century after “after it officially began, the contest between capitalism and socialism is over: 
capitalism has won” (Heilbroner 1989: 98). Socialism “was the tragic failure of the twentieth century” 
(Heilbroner 2008). Even social democracy and the mixed economy have proven unsustainable, at least, in their 
most ambitious forms, as nationalized industries in Great Britain and France have gone bankrupt (Yergin and 
Stanislaw 2002) and welfare states have discovered they cannot afford their unfunded liabilities (Creveld 1999). 
Several of the more profligate European states have been forced to pursue austerity programs in order to pare 
down their debt to manageable levels, and the neoliberal Washington Consensus has insisted on similar 
conditions for aid to developing countries in Latin America. 
But we cannot complacently assume that the relevant lessons have been learned forever more. “Those 
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it,” as Santyana said. Today's 26 year old PhD candidates 
were born in 1990, just barely prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. College freshmen were in born in 1998, 
and by the time they are entering college today, a quarter of a century will have passed since the Soviet Union 
ceased to be. They have no personal memories of actually existing socialism, if we do not teach them why 
socialism failed, they will have no reason to believe it should not be tried again. They might not even realize 
they are trying anything “again”; if we do not educate them better, they might not even realize socialism was 
ever tried before. None of our students will know anything about socialism except what we teach them. 
Therefore, we must ensure we understand why socialism failed. We cannot teach our students the lessons to be 
learned from history unless we have learned them ourselves. Therefore, the failure of socialism deserves a 
restatement.
This essay is an exercise in political theory, exploring the political-institutional reasons why democratic 
socialism or economic democracy must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims and intentions of its advocates. It 
is not an application of economic theory, and it does not attempt to show whether socialism must fail for purely 
economic reasons. That argument has been made elsewhere, in the Austrian literature on the impossibility of 
economic calculation under socialism (Hayek 1935; Hayek 1948: 77-91, 119-208; Brutzkus 1935; Mises 1981 
[1922]: 95-194; Hoff 1981 [1938]; Leoni 2009 [1965]; Lavoie 1985a; Lavoie 1985b; Steele 1992; de Soto 2010; 
Boettke 1998; Boettke 2012: 76-96, 226-240). For the sake of argument, this essay assumes that there is no 
problem of rational economic calculation under socialism. As far as is this essay is concerned, the Lange-Lerner-
Taylor solution of market socialism might as well have successfully refuted Mises's, Hayek's, and Rothbard's 
claim that rational economic calculation is impossible under socialism. What this essay will argue is that 
democratic socialism must fail, not necessarily because it is socialist, but because it is democratic. Even if 
socialism were economically feasible, it cannot be successfully institutionalized by democratic means and still 
accomplish its goals. Even if it were possible to implement an economically rational form of socialism, its 
political institutions could not be democratic and it could not promise to safeguard individual rights and liberties 
against government abuse. 
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Furthermore, not only is democratic socialism unable to promise liberty, but democratic socialism is not 
compatible with Lange's market socialism either. Even if we concede for the sake of argument – as this essay 
does – that Lange et. al. successfully refuted Mises and Hayek, this essay will demonstrate that market socialism 
is institutionally incompatible with economic democracy. In other words: the claim is not that democratic 
socialism cannot economically calculate, but that democratic socialism is politically distinct from market 
socialism in such a way that previous attempts to show that market socialism can calculate are inapplicable to 
democratic socialism. This means that advocates of democratic socialism must craft a new refutation of Mises 
and Hayek that does not rely on Lange et. al. This does not necessarily mean that democratic socialism cannot 
economically calculate, but it means that all previous attempts to show that it can are inapplicable and that Mises 
and Hayek must be refuted anew.
This criticism of democratic socialism will build on F. A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) whose 
arguments differ crucially from more recent criticisms of market socialism by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny (1994). Shliefer and Vishny (1994) utilize basic Public Choice to argue that market socialism would be 
susceptible to the inefficiencies of rent-seeking because politicians cannot be sufficiently incentivized to promote 
economically efficient resource allocation. Although the target of Shleifer's and Vishny's criticism is market 
socialism, their arguments apply equally well to democratic socialism. 
Similarly, Hayek (2007 [1944]) used economic analysis to criticize the political institutional logic of 
democratic socialism (Boettke 1995). Hayek's argument is, like that of Shleifer and Vishny, a form of Public 
Choice (Boettke 1995).1 But Hayek went beyond Shleifer's and Vishny's (correct) argument that political 
officials will misuse their power and be insufficiently incentivized, giving rise to economic inefficiency. 
According to Hayek, the problem is more profound: democracy is fundamentally incompatible with socialism on 
the most basic, essential level. Hayek argues, not that politicians will abuse their power or that socialism will 
give rise to economic inefficiency, but that democracy and socialism are fundamentally incompatible, and 
therefore, that democratic socialism is logically incoherent. The political and economic systems simply do not 
match up in any coherent fashion.
It should be realized that what Hayek chiefly criticized was not redistribution of income by high levels 
of taxation, but command-and-control regulation and government ownership of the means of production. 
Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) criticized the British Labour Party's policy of nationalization, and Hayek 
was inspired by the de facto nationalization-by-regulation accomplished by the National Socialist regime in 
Germany.2 Hayek was not primarily concerned with high levels of taxation and redistribution of income such as 
we might find in Sweden. As Bruce Caldwell notes (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 30f.), “[T]he existence of such states 
[i.e. welfare states], and whatever successes they may or may not have had, does not undermine Hayek’s logical 
argument from The Road to Serfdom: a welfare state is not socialism.”3 Because taxation and subsidy do not 
entail the same degree of command-and-control as does regulation, therefore, the example of Sweden does not 
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refute Hayek (pace Samuelson in Farrant and McPhail 2009: 5, 9, 11, 12). The Swedish system relied and still 
relies predominately on redistribution of income, with relatively little regulation or nationalization (Stein 1991, 
Sanandaji 2011).4 Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010: 235) note that according to their empirical verification of 
Hayek's thesis,5
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis [that economic liberty is a necessary precondition for political 
liberty] is confirmed most strongly when looking at the legal structure and property rights and 
the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are 
more closely identified with political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index 
(fiscal size of government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
Not all government interventions in the economy are equally likely to lead us along the road to serfdom. Hence, 
when I speak of “socialism,” I have a very specific meaning in mind: nationalization and central planning, or 
else command-and-control regulation so extensive that it begins to approach nationalization and central 
planning.6 This was the classical meaning of “socialism” as intended by socialists themselves. Fundamentally, 
what socialism so defined means is the abolition or severe restriction of the price system, where explicit 
government commands and regulations replace the information and incentivize function of prices.
The essay proceeds as follows: section I summarizes and evaluates some of the statements and policies 
put forth by advocates of democratic socialism. Section II, the heart of this paper, builds on Hayek (2007 
[1944])'s argument and demonstrates that there are at least two widely divergent conceptions of democracy. But 
according to either conception, democratic socialism must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims of its 
advocates. Democratic socialism is impossible, not necessarily because socialism is untenable as an economic 
system, but because socialism is not sufficiently compatible with any form of political democracy or democratic 
values. Section III is divided into three portions, each discussing a distinct reason why economic socialism is 
incompatible with political democracy: (a) distinguishes between limited democracy as a means and totalitarian 
or absolute democracy as an end; (b) discusses the problem of periodic elections, where the electorate may 
democratically reject socialism; and (c) demonstrates that democratic socialism would disrupt international 
trade, leading to tensions in foreign relations, contrary to the democratic peace hypothesis. Section III concludes.
I. THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS
First, we will investigate what the democratic socialists themselves have said. A singular difficulty in 
evaluating democratic socialism is that it is not always clear from what the advocates themselves say, which 
specific political and economic system they have in mind. They have plenty to say in criticism of capitalism and 
the market economy and about the egalitarian ethics which motivate their criticism, but they are far less precise 
about the details of the system they would have replace capitalism. Recently, the editors of Dissent magazine 
(Dissent 2015) decided to “present a selection of key essays on democratic socialism from [their] archives.” To 
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avoid bias, this essay will follow largely follow Dissent's lead and predominately characterize democratic 
socialism according to the essays chosen by those editors, to wit: Howe and Coser (1954), Denitch (1978), 
Harrington (1978a), Phillips (1997), Heilbroner (1978a), Coser (1978). and Walzer (1978, 2010). In essence, 
we will let the editors of Dissent define democratic socialism for us. We will also refer occasionally to several 
other authors where it seems appropriate, including Archer (1995), Schweickart (1992), Burczak (2006, 2011), 
Dahl (1985), and to several works by George Orwell.
Irving Howe and Lewis Coser (1954) devote most of their essay (1954: 122-131) to a discussion of the 
Marxist criticism of utopian socialism. Only approximately the third quarter (1954: 131-135) lays out something 
resembling a concrete plan. The remainder of the essay (1954: 136-138) deals with the nature of work and 
leisure under socialism. Unfortunately, this sketch is not altogether clear. Howe and Coser note (1954: 133) that 
“a great deal of traditional socialist thought has stressed economic centralization as a prerequisite for planning” 
but that “[w]hatever the historical validity of these emphases on centralism, they must now be abandoned.” 
Instead, they propose “small decentralized industrial units” and “relatively small economic units.” The reason for 
this is that (Howe and Coser 1954: 134; cf. Denitch 1978: 354f.)
The presence of numerous political and economic units, living together in a tension of 
cooperation-and-conflict, seems the best “guarantee” that power will not accumulate in the 
hands of a managerial oligarchy
But however large or small these industrial units are, they still require central direction from the state. Howe and 
Coser say (1954: 134) their policy 
implies a considerable modification of the familiar socialist emphasis on nationalization of the 
means of production, increase of productivity, a master economic plan, etc.—a modification but 
not a total rejection. To be sure, socialism still presupposes the abolition of private property in 
the basic industries.
Thus, their scheme still relies on nationalization and political planning. On the other hand, they state that this 
“requires only a loose guiding direction, a general pointer from above” (Howe and Coser 1954: 134), without 
explaining what this really means. Nevertheless, it seems clear that what Howe and Coser have in mind is 
socialism of the classical sort – viz. state ownership and direction of the means of production – and not of the 
newer, Scandinavian sort – i.e. basically free-markets with large transfer payments. 
In addition, Howe and Coser (1954: 134) and Bogdan Denitch (1978) endorse some sort of guild 
socialism / syndicalism / workplace democracy, but they do not seem aware that workplace democracy 
essentially translates to free-market capitalism where the shareholders of a firm happen to be the firm's 
employees. In other words, under workplace democracy, the workers own the firms, but the firms compete with 
each other on the free-market in a typically capitalist fashion. Therefore, it is not clear how this is reconcilable 
with nationalization and centralized direction of the economy or any other canons of socialism. As Don Lavoie 
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(1985a: 127) notes,
Workers' control of the means of production appears to represent the long-range goal of these 
democratic socialists, but not much is said about what this entails concretely; neither is it ever 
explained why workers' control over their workplace should require, or even be consistent with, 
national economic planning.
Furthermore, some firms will be more profitable than others, and so the workers who own those firms 
will obtain higher incomes than the workers who own less profitable firms (Mises 1981 [1922]: 238, 242; cf. 
Caplan n.d. #1). Hence, workplace democracy is incompatible with egalitarianism too. And if income is 
nationally (or internationally) redistributed to achieve an equal outcome, then the workers do not really own their 
firms anymore. That is to say, if workers of a given firm obtain the same equal income regardless of which firm 
they own and irrespective of whether they operate their firm at a profit or a loss – regardless of any decisions 
they democratically make, in fact – then there is little sense sense in which the workers really do own their firm.
Moreover, it may be that many workers do not want to own a significant stake in their firm, for they may 
be happier drawing a steady, reliable salary than uncertain, variable profit. Workplace democracy entails that 
workers take on the role of entrepreneur who earns a profit – or crucially, a loss – depending on the accuracy of 
their entrepreneurial speculation and foresight. It may be that many workers do not wish to be mere residual 
claimants. Instead, they may wish to draw salaries even when the firm incurs losses. As Lavoie (1985a: 128) 
says, mandatory workplace democracy entails “forcing workers – who may not want to take on the risk, expense, 
and responsibility involved in managing a firm – to do so anyway.” 
Besides, in a free-market, it is already legal for workers to establish a firm which they will own 
themselves, or for them to purchase a controlling share in the firm's stock (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127).7 For example, 
Archer (1995)'s version of workplace democracy specifies that workers or their representative labor movement 
purchase a controlling stake in the firm from the firm's owners through a series of mutually-acceptable 
compromises; hence, there is no act of expropriation which is inconsistent with free-market capitalism. 
Meanwhile, Schweickart (1992: 28-36) argues at length that in general, worker-management will be more 
efficient than traditional management. But if this were the case, then we ought to expect investors will invest 
more in worker-managed firms so that they earn a higher return than if they invested in traditionally managed 
firms (cf. Steele 1992: 323-349). Similarly, if workers preferred the combination of wages and working 
conditions offered by workplace democracy, then we would expect capitalists, competing with each other for 
scarce labor, to cater to these workers' demands (cf. Steele 1992: 323-349). Thus, it is not clear why an embrace 
of workplace democracy requires a rejection of capitalism. The capitalist utopia already includes the socialist 
utopia as a voluntary option for those who desire it (Brennan 2014: 94-98).8 In general, capitalism allows the 
private institutions of civil society to be as democratic as their members wish them to be. For example, the 
mutual aid societies which preceded the modern welfare state were often organized on a democratic basis and 
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they gave their members a significant opportunity to exercise responsibility and to hold authority in a way which 
proved educational and which helped them build character (Green 1993). If democracy is demanded because it 
promotes civic virtue, this demand can be accommodated under capitalism with little if any government 
intervention. 
Some authors (e.g. Dahl 1985 – see Green 1986; Burczak 2006, 2011) would reply that workplace 
democracy should be made mandatory; firms should be compelled to submit to worker control. Others would say 
that the government should “encourage” workplace democracy (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127). But this would merely 
entail an interventionist form of capitalism: excepting the imposition of ad hoc regulations, the private worker-
owned firms would continue to freely compete with each other in a marketplace (Burczak 2006, 2011), and some 
firms – and therefore, their employees – would be more profitable and prosperous than others (Mises 1981 
[1922]: 238, 242; cf. Caplan n.d. #1). This is not socialism, but merely interventionism. Whether a policy 
mandating or encouraging this arrangement is a good idea is debatable,9 but such a policy is conceivable only 
under capitalism.10 In fact, Theodore Burczak (2006, 2011) advocates mandatory workplace democracy as the 
only acceptable form of socialism precisely precisely because it is otherwise compatible with free-market 
capitalism and avoids Hayek's criticisms of central-planning.11 Hence, when Howe and Coser (1954: 134) and 
Denitch (1978) advocate workplace democracy, it is not clear why this is an example of socialism and not 
merely a modified form of capitalism (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127)d.
Michael Harrington's plan (1978a) is similarly muddled. He aims to move “beyond the welfare state” 
(Harrington 1978a: 440, 451) and to “transfer the control of basic investment decisions from private boardrooms 
to the democratic process” (Harrington 1978a: 442). He explicitly advocates state direction of the economy, 
calling for “a national planning process in which all the people would have an effective right to participate” 
(Harrington 1978a: 442, emphasis in original). On the other hand, despite his intent to “move beyond the welfare 
state,” he envisions “three main types of economic organization: socially owned; privately owned large 
enterprises; and cooperatives” (Harrington 1978a: 446). So there will be privately-owned firms as well as 
worker-owned firms, both of which must compete on the market with government-owned firms. It is not clear 
how this is different from the regulated, mixed economy which Harrington has rejected. With Harrington's 
confusing eclecticism, “one almost gets the impression that a shotgun tactic is deliberately being used here” 
(Lavoie 1985a: 151 re: Carnoy and Shearer). 
In any case, according to Harrington, wherever a conflict arises between the private firms and the central 
plan, the latter will take priority: “individual enterprises or industries cannot be given the right to veto the 
democratic plans of the entire nation” (Harrington 1978a: 447). At the same time, Harrington believes that 
competition among state-owned firmed will curb any abuse of power (Harrington 1978a: 448); he does not 
explain how state-owned and democratically-directed firms can be made to compete against each other when a 
democratic plan commands the private firms what they must do and how. Harrington fails to realize that unlike 
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market competition, political rivalry simply means a zero-sum competition for monopoly status; political actors 
merely vie for exclusive receipt of special privilege, with none of the benefits of market competition accruing to 
anybody (Lavoie 1985a: 135f., 140).
A key indication of Harrington's confusion is his approving citation of Oskar Lange (1938)'s market 
socialism (Harrington 1978a: 443f.), which he fails to realize is incompatible with democratic socialism. 
Harrington admits that according to Ludwig von Mises (1920), rational economic cost accounting is impossible 
under socialism. But he summarily replies that Mises has been refuted by Oskar Lange's market socialism 
socialism. Harrington does not seem aware, however, of the fact that market socialism is fundamentally 
incompatible with democratic socialism. According to Lange, socialism can calculate if the government's 
officials follow strict, non-discretionary rules of cost-accounting. Essentially, the socialist government's officials 
are to perform the same sorts of calculations which a Neoclassical economics professor performs on the 
classroom blackboard, such as expanding output until marginal revenue equals marginal cost, etc. Market 
socialism, according to Lange, is meant to imitate the market, or more properly, market socialism is to replicate 
what the market would do under conditions of perfect competition. “Thus,” Lange (1938: 82) says, “the 
accounting prices in a socialist economy, far from being arbitrary, have quite the same objective character as the 
market prices in a regime of competition. . . . Our study of the determination of equilibrium prices in a socialist 
economy has shown that the process of price determination is quite analogous to that in a competitive market.” 
There is no room in Lange's system for any democratic input or discretion. The government's officials 
are to determine the solutions to simultaneous differential equations by a method of trial-and-error, adjusting 
parametrized prices until quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. Lange's goal is for the government to 
discover the single optimal equilibrium set of prices and outputs. The government's officials could be chosen 
democratically if this is desired, but it makes no fundamental difference whether they are democratically chosen 
or not, because all the officials do is follow strict rules of accounting.12 But according to Harrington, the goal of 
democratic socialism is to “transfer the control of basic investment decisions from private boardrooms to the 
democratic process” (Harrington 1978a: 442). Hence, what Harrington requires is the very opposite of Lange's 
strict rules of accounting without discretion. Harrington requires that “we the people” will be able to obtain 
whatever “we” want from the government and from the economy, whereas Lange's goal is for the government to 
discover a single, indisputable mathematical equilibrium which is immune from political clamouring. Harrington 
seeks to maximize democratic discretion while Lange aims to abolish all discretion; the two systems are seeking 
very different outcomes.13 
Schweickart (1992) also makes precisely the same mistake as Harrington in his defense of economic 
democracy, and for this reason, Scheickart's system is difficult to criticize as well. Like Harrington, Scheickart 
(1992: 11) appeals to Lange to refute Mises, unaware that economic democracy and market socialism are 
antithetical. Schweickart (1992: 19) speaks of “worker self-managed market socialism,” implying a system 
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where workers are responsible for implementing Lange's strict, non-discretionary rules of cost-accounting. It is 
not clear why it is preferable for workers to implement these rules rather than trained accountants. Then he 
speaks a “democratic, market-conforming plan” (Schweickart 1992: 19), unaware of the fact that a plan cannot 
be simultaneously democratic and market-conforming. Schweickart (1992: 20 n. 7) specifies that wage 
differentials will be restricted in order to limit income inequality, but this is incompatible with market socialism, 
which specifies that wages are to be determined by the Neoclassical economic law of marginal productivity 
(Lange 1938: 83). And while Schweickart specifies a market economy wherein worker-managed firms must 
compete with each other on the basis of free-market prices determined by supply and demand (1992: 19, 21), he 
also dictates that investment will be socially determined by a democratic process (1992: 19, 22). But which is it? 
These two components of the scheme are incompatible. And if investment is socially determined, by what 
method will calculation be determined to be economically rational, i.e. how will the system ensure that ends are 
achieved with the least cost, so that as many ends can be simultaneously achieved as possible? When any end is 
achieved at higher cost than is necessary, then more of another end must be sacrificed than was necessary. This is 
the essence of the problem of economic calculation, which applies under all systems, both capitalist and 
socialist. Furthermore, Schweickart (1992: 22) declares that labor costs are not to be accounted for, but 
according to Lange (1938: 83)'s market socialism, labor costs are as real as any other costs, and rational 
economic calculation requires that labor be economically allocated and conserved. The same laws of rational 
economic calculation apply to all systems, both market-based and socialist. In general, Schweickart appears to 
have no understanding at all of the meaning and significance of the problem of economic calculation. It is 
difficult to criticize Schweickart's system because it is so amorphous, indeterminate, and incoherent.
Therefore, Harrington and Schweikart cannot appeal to Lange to refute Mises's thesis of the 
impossibility of economic calculation under socialism, because Lange's solution to Mises's problem is 
incompatible with Harrington's and Schweickart's institutions and goals. Hence, Harrington and Schweichkart 
must refute Mises themselves, and show how a democratic, majoritarian planning process could succeed in 
economically rational cost-accounting. Don Lavoie (1985a: 125-171) has shown this is impossible. But as this is 
an essay in political theory, not economic theory, we do not wish to subject democratic socialism too much to the 
criticism of economic price-theory. Our point is simply that the murky and muddled nature of Harrington's and 
Schweickart's proposals is indicated by the fact that he has approvingly cited someone – viz. Lange – whose 
scheme is diametrically opposed to his own. Of course, this murkiness works to Harrington's and Schweickart's 
advantages because it is much more difficult to criticize what cannot be grasped.
Nevertheless, in the end, Harrington does appear to endorse some form of planning, regardless of how 
democratic it is. For elsewhere he states (1978b: 356), “The socialist essential, it must always be remembered, is 
not the plan; it is the democratic power of the people over the plan and the planners.” And further (1978b: 357), 
“What must be done—in theory and in practice—is to counterpose democratic planning to command planning.” 
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Harrington does, after all, call for a form of government planning of the economy, albeit democratic rather than 
imposed by a hierarchical elite. Compared to Soviet-style planning, what Harrington wishes to change is not 
what is done but merely by whom it is done. This point must be emphasized. Discussing democratic socialists in 
general, Lavoie (1985a: 135) notes “their insistence that the planning they advocate must be decentralized, or 
'from the bottom up,' rather than centralized, or 'from the top down.'” Lest one mistakenly believe that such 
decentralized planning implies a rejection of government planning, Lavoie (ibid.) immediately adds, “it must be 
clarified that these writers do believe there will have to be one central office that will have to oversee and 
coordinate the plans of other levels and branches of government.” Notwithstanding that the impetus for such 
planning will originate democratically, this still implies government planning of the economy.
Next, the editors of Dissent (2015) cite Anne Phillips (1997) as an example of democratic socialism as 
well. But it is not clear what relation her essay bears to democratic socialism. Phillips argues that sexual 
disparities in income that are not due to any sexual difference in ability are illegitimate, just as racial disparities 
are. Phillips (1997: 34) argues that women are paid less than men, not primarily due to employer discrimination 
but rather because women's socially-expected domestic duties require them to work fewer hours for less pay. 
Phillips (1997: 37) proposes interventions such as mandatory paid parental leave, and she notes (1997: 38),
the kind of sexual equality I am describing might then turn out to be compatible with a capitalist 
economy. It is not compatible, however, with a hands-off noninterventionism that allows the 
immediate requirements of employers to dictate the hours and patterns of work. What I am 
describing here is probably more accurately described as social democracy than socialism.
There we have it: Phillips is not advocating democratic socialism at all. But perhaps we can learn what 
democratic socialism is by examining what it is not. The editors of Dissent (2015) have chosen to feature 
Phillips (1997) in a collection of articles about democratic socialism. Phillips (1997) has advocated a set of 
welfare-state interventions which she claims are characteristic of social democracy and not socialism. Therefore, 
we can conclude that democratic socialism does not mean welfare-state intervention nor is democratic socialism 
identical with social democracy. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that democratic socialism must entail planning.
Indeed, the next essay cited by Dissent (2015), Heilbroner (1978a), states (p. 341), “[b]eyond the welfare 
state lies the terra incognita we call socialism.” And again (ibid.), “Socialism, as most of us think about it, is not 
just an improved welfare state. It is another kind of society.” In his reply to Heilbroner, Bodgdan Denitch (1978: 
351) agrees, speaking of “a socialist society, the one presumably beyond the welfare state, the one in which 
socialists are no longer just adding one more reform to a pyramid of welfare-state reforms.”According to 
Heilbroner (1978a: 342f.), the welfare-state is simply the means by which capitalism saves itself.14 Therefore 
(Heilbroner 1978a: 343), “the welfare state, adequate or not, must be considered as a form of capitalism” and 
socialism – including democratic socialism – must entail planning. As Heilbroner says (1978a: 343), socialism 
“must depend for its economic direction on some form of planning, and for its culture on some form of 
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commitment to the idea of a morally conscious collectivity . . . the coordinating mechanism then becomes 
'command.'”15
At this point, we take a brief detour from Dissent (2015)'s reading list and examine the views of perhaps 
the most famous democratic socialist of all, George Orwell.16 As Orwell noted (1946: 1083f.), “Every line of 
serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and 
for democratic Socialism, as I understand it” (emphasis in original). Orwell (1941a: 334) advocated the 
Nationalization of land, mines, railways, banks, and major industries. . . . The general tendency 
of this program aims quite frankly at turning . . . England into a Socialist democracy.”
In several places (Orwell 1941a: 317, 1941b: 1684, 1944: 232), Orwell warned that nationalization without 
egalitarian democracy would simply lead to “oligarchical collectivism” and caste rule. Richard White (2008:84) 
observes that Orwell (1941a) 
is at pains to point out that nationalization or ownership of the means of production achieves 
nothing if the workers remain subject to a ruling cadre who make all the important decisions in 
the name of “the State.”
Orwell (1935: 926) wrote that
Socialism used to be defined as “common ownership of the means of production,” but it is now 
seen that if common ownership means no more than centralized control, it merely paves the way 
for a new form of oligarchy. Centralized control is a necessary pre-condition of Socialism, but it 
no more produces Socialism than my typewriter would of itself produce this article I am writing.
Discussing the rise of totalitarianism, Orwell (1939: 111) states that, “The essential act is the rejection of 
democracy – that is, of the underlying values of democracy; once you have decided upon that, Stalin – or at any 
rate something like Stalin – is already on the way.” According to Orwell, then, a necessary condition for 
socialism is nationalization of the means of production and central planning, but this is not sufficient without 
democracy. Democratic socialism, according to Orwell, is just that: planning and nationalization in a democratic, 
egalitarian fashion.
Returning to Dissent (2015)'s list, the final essay, written by Michael Walzer (2010), stands on its own. 
Unlike all of the authors we have seen so far, Walzer (2010: 38) explicitly equates socialism with social 
democracy: “Today’s socialism—social democracy is probably the more accurate name. . .” He lists three 
essential traits of “today's socialism” (2010: 38): democracy, market regulation, and the welfare-state. Hence, 
“the question 'Which socialism?' translates into 'What degree of democratic participation, market regulation, and 
welfare provision should we aim at?'” (Walzer 2010: 38). Walzer argues that the distinguishing characteristic of 
socialism is not a specific policy platform or political regime, but the means by which policies are pursued and 
the aims for which policies are sought: “What is most important, then, is not the final realization of socialist 
goals, but the process by which they are realized” (Walzer 2010: 39). He almost equates socialism with some 
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sort of deliberative or majoritarian democracy, saying “Ours is a 'participatory' socialism” (Walzer 2010: 39). 
Socialism is the process of “socialism-in-the-making” by the common workers, on the grassroots level (Walzer 
2010: 41). Socialism-in-the-making “take[s] place in their unions, movements, parties, churches, and mutual aid 
organizations—in civil society, that is, and not in the state” (Walzer 2010: 42). Elsewhere (1978: 358), Walzer 
states that value attaches to the democratic process, not to its outcomes. So socialism simply means the outcome 
of authentically democratic action within civil society, regardless of what kind of policy platform or political 
regime this produces. One wonders: if the common people voted for laissez-faire capitalism, would socialism 
mean capitalism? At this point, the moniker “socialism” seems superfluous, for if socialism simply means 
democracy, then let us call it democracy. Walzer is not advocating democratic socialism, but simply plain 
democracy, period. Perhaps, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the evident failure of actually existent 
socialism, Walzer has simply run out of ideas. As Heilbroner has noted elsewhere (1989: 109),
The collapse of centralized planning shows that at this moment socialism has no plausible 
economic framework, but the word has always meant more than a system of economic 
organization. At its core, it has stood for a commitment to social goals that have seemed 
incompatible with, or at least unattainable under, capitalism-above all, the moral, not just the 
material, elevation of humankind.”
Be this as it may; we still need an operational definition of democratic socialism. We have seen that all 
of the rest of the authors besides Walzer equate democratic socialism either with planning or else with 
syndicalism. And as we have dismissed syndicalism as merely a form of capitalism, we shall assume, for the 
remainder of this essay, that democratic socialism entails government economic planning. Thus, democratic 
socialism is the system wherein the entire economy – meaning, every material aspect of life – is subject to 
political decision-making by a democratic government. According to Mises (1981 [1922]: 399), it is the theory 
that “The People must take the administration of economic matters into their own hands, just as they have taken 
over the government of the state.” Or in Lavoie's (1985a: 126) words, “The basic message of this movement is 
that a 'democratic' form of planning ought to be advocated as the only feasible alternative to fascism or corporate 
planning.” In fact, this definition – of democratic socialism as implying democratic planning – squares nicely 
with Walzer's definition of socialism as pure democratic political action: democratic socialism is the political 
system in which there is no limitation on democracy – when every material aspect of life, without exception, is 
subject to democratic decision. The sphere of democratic governance is simply expanded to encompass the entire 
economy. In Lavoie's (1985a: 127) words, “The central idea associated with the phrase 'economic democracy' is 
the pleasant-sounding notion that democracy, which has heretofore been restricted to the political sphere, should 
be extended into the economic sphere.” The two notions of democratic planning and pure democracy come to 
mean essentially the same thing: all of human existence is to be democratically socialized.
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II. HAYEK'S ARGUMENT: TWO CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
1. Democracy as a Means vs. an End, or: Liberal vs. Illiberal Democracy
Hayek argues, however, that this democratic socialization of human life will fail to satisfy or safeguard 
democratic values concerning the protection of individual freedom and human rights. According to Hayek, 
democracy is only a means to an end. But, says Hayek, the implementation of socialist policy demands the use 
of means which are incompatible with democray. The two policies – socialization and democratization – simply 
cannot be fulfilled simultaneously.
As economists emphasize, some means are more appropriate than others to achieve given ends, and 
some means are completely inappropriate for certain ends. According to Hayek, this is true of democracy as 
well:
Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and 
individual freedom. As such it is by no means infallible or certain. . . . [There is] the misleading 
and unfounded belief that, so long as the ultimate source of power is the will of the majority, the 
power cannot be arbitrary. . . . If democracy resolves on a task which necessarily involves the 
use of power which cannot be guided by fixed rules, it must become an arbitrary power. (Hayek 
2007 [1944]: 110f.)17
According to Hayek, in other words, democracy is but a means to the end of limiting power.18 Some of the 
advocates of democratic socialism share this conception. For example Lavoie (1985a: 137) quotes Alperovitz 
and Faux's statement that we need to develop “new democratic arrangements to avoid the dangers of centralized 
bureaucratic power” and John Buell's argument that “without it [democracy], that planning that is surely coming 
in one form or another carry a heavy measure of repression.” These advocates of democracy socialism agree 
with Hayek that a critical function of democracy is the limitation of the exercise of government power.
But if the government's policy is one which necessarily relies on absolute political power to be 
implemented, then either democracy must be sacrificed to the policy, or the policy must be sacrificed to 
democracy. One cannot combine a policy of limiting government power via democracy on the one hand, with a 
socialist policy which necessarily requires unlimited government power to be implemented. One – democratic 
limitation or socialist absolutism – must be subordinated to the other. Even if democracy were somehow 
maintained under socialism it would still not accomplish its purpose, for the purpose of democracy is to limit 
power but a socialist government would necessarily be unlimited. An authentically socialist democratic regime 
socialism would at best be a tyrannical despotism which somehow succeeded in maintaining the outward 
trappings of democracy without maintaining anything of the spirit or intention of democracy. It would be 
something akin to giving a slave the power to elect his slave-master without giving him the freedom to escape 
the plantation.
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One might reply that in fact, democracy is not merely a means to an end; democracy is not merely a 
method by which to limit political power. Instead, democracy might be conceived as an end unto itself. Coser 
and Howe (1954: 132) are right to argue that
the distinction made in English political theory, but neglected by Marxists, between democracy 
as an expression of popular sovereignity [sic] and democracy as a pattern of government in 
which the rights of minority groups are especially defended, needs to be taken seriously.
Michael Walzer comes close to the conception of democracy as an expression of popular sovereignty rather than 
as a means of protecting minorities, arguing that value inheres not in the socialist outcomes but in the democratic 
process itself (Walzer 2010, 1978: 358). This means that for Walzer, democracy is not a means but an end. 
Several other advocates of democratic socialism seem to agree, saying for example that “the democratic process 
means allowing people to make direct input into decisions that affect their lives” (Lavoie 1985a: 127 quoting 
Tom Hayden) and that we need “active popular participation in the day-to-day running of the basic institutions of 
the economy and the society” (Lavoie 1985a: 127 quoting Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison). In this 
conception, democracy is not merely a means for obtaining the good – such as by restraining governmental 
abuse of power to protect minorities – but rather, democracy is itself fundamentally constitutive of the good. The 
good is good because it is democratic. It is not the outcomes or benefits of democracy which are good, but 
democracy is itself good regardless of its consequences.19
But when the good is defined as the democratic consensus, there is no room left for any constitutional 
restraints on the exercise of democratic power. This may quickly produce an illiberal democracy where there are 
no constitutional limits on power (Percy 1955: 61, Röpke 1998 [1957]: 66, 68). Individual rights and freedoms 
will be routinely disregarded. As Hayek wrote elsewhere (1984a [1976]: 353),
Thus arose unlimited democracy . . . [from the belief] that the control of government by elected 
representatives of the majority made any other checks on the powers of government 
unnecessary, so that all the various constitutional safeguards which had been developed in the 
course of time could be dispensed with.
Similarly, Mises wrote (1981 [1922]: 64f.),
Grave injury has been done to the concept of democracy by those who, exaggerating the natural 
law notion of sovereignty, conceived it as limitless rule of the volonté générale (general will). 
There is really no essential difference between the unlimited power of the democratic state and 
the unlimited power of the autocrat. The idea that carries away our demagogues and their 
supporters, the idea that the state can do whatever it wishes, and that nothing should resist the 
will of the sovereign people, has done more evil perhaps than the caesar-mania of degenerate 
princelings. Both have the same origin in the notion of a state based purely on political might.
If there is any constitutional restriction permitted by absolute democracy, it is that the people are forbidden to 
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constrain their own popular sovereignty. The one constitutional limitation is that there cannot be any limitations 
on the exercise of democracy power even if the people desire them (cf. Talmon 1960: 205, 236); the one rule is 
that there are no rules.
This illiberal aspect of absolute democracy stands in contrast to liberal, limited democracy. According to 
Hague and Harrop (2007: 49),
[L]iberal democracy is a compromise. Specifically, it seeks to integrate the authority of 
democratic governments with simultaneous limits on their scope. By definition, liberal 
democracy is limited government. ... Elected rulers are subject to constitutions that usually 
include a statement of individual rights. ... In these respects, a liberal democracy is democracy 
disarmed.
Hayek of course would have endorsed limited democracy, for he understood democracy as a means by which to 
limit the exercise of political power. For him, democracy is only a means to facilitate the achievement of the 
good society but it is not constitutive of the good itself. On another occasion, Hayek wrote (1984a [1976]: 354),20
I must confess to preferring non-democratic government under the law to unlimited (and 
therefore essentially lawless) democratic government. Government under the law seems to me to 
be the higher value, which it was once hoped that democratic watch-dogs would preserve.
A similar preference for the rule-of-law over popular sovereignty once animated American political culture as 
well. As Edward S. Corwin (1955: 4) says of America's founding philosophy:
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground solely of its rootage in popular 
will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth of American constitutional theory. 
Earlier the supremacy accorded to constitutions was ascribed less to their putative source than to 
their supposed content, to their embodiment of an essential and unchanging justice. . . . There 
are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their 
own intrinsic excellence, all together regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical 
resources of the community. 
This reinforces Hague and Harrop's (2007: 49), argument that the United States represents “the most liberal (and 
perhaps the least democratic) of all the liberal democracies.” According to the classical liberal conception, the 
popular will as such has no normative value. What classical liberalism demanded was justice and the protection 
of individual rights by whichever means were most expedient. Democracy had at most instrumental value as a 
means for effecting justice and peace, but it was justice and peace, not democracy, that were sought for their own 
sakes. 
This classical liberal conception is incompatible with socialism. Democratic socialism appears to 
necessarily embrace a majoritarian, unlimited, absolutist conception of democracy wherein the democratic 
process is constitutive of the good; the good is good because it is democratic. But such a conception has little 
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place for constitutional limits on power or for the protection of civil liberties, and it quickly slides into unlimited, 
illiberal democracy. If the good is whatever the democratic process decides upon, then there is nothing to protect 
minority or individual rights, for any constitutional protections would subvert absolute democracy. If 51% of the 
people decide to abolish the freedom of speech of 49% of the people, then any constitutional right to free speech 
would undermine popular sovereignty. If the will of the people is absolutely sovereign, then nothing, not even 
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty, can be allowed to obstruct that democratic will. If such 
constitutional guarantees do exist, then it is the people's rights – not their democratic will – which is sovereign. 
As Hague and Harrop say (2007: 49), “Liberal democracy is a settlement between individual liberty and 
collective politics,” but under democratic socialism, there obviously – by definition – cannot be anything to 
dilute the purity of collective politics. Talmon's (1960: 112) gloss on the French Revolution applies here as well: 
The idea of democracy implied here contains no reference to the right of opposition, to 
individual liberties or toleration, and clearly revives the ancient Greek view of democracy as the 
victory of the mass of the under-privileged over the privileged minority, and the suppression of 
the latter by the former.
Absolute democratic sovereignty can produce an illiberal democracy by yet another route as well. It may 
be, not that 51% of the people vote with the express intention to violate the rights of 49%, but instead, the 
majority of the people may vote for a demagogic populist who promises to protect and enrich the people 
provided only that they hand over to him authoritarian power. This authoritarian populist will tend to impose 
limitations on the freedom of speech in order to protect his own regime, and he will often work to ensure that the 
courts and judges are not independent of his will. Such a democracy will be illiberal, not because the people 
directly voted for illiberal policies which deliberately intended to plunder minorities at the expense of the 
majority, but instead, because the people used their sovereignty to elect a populist who proceeded to illiberally 
subject the press and the courts to his private will. The dictator may use defamation laws to silence any criticism 
of him. As Jacob Talmon notes (1960: 104f.),
The ancients have already understood, and indeed witnessed, the phenomenon of extreme 
democracy leading straight to personal tyranny. Modern experience has added one link, the role 
of the totalitarian-democratic vanguard in a plebiscitary régime, posing as the people. The 
fervour and ceaseless activity of the believers, on the one hand, and intimidation practised on 
opponents and the lukewarm, on the other, are the instruments by which the desired “general 
will” is made to appear as the will of all. Only one voice is heard, and it is voiced with such an 
insistence, vehemence, self-righteous fervour and a tone of menace that all other voices are 
drowned, cowed, and silenced.
Such things have often happened in recent decades in Latin America, for example, “with the urban poor seeking 
salvation through a strong, populist leader” (Hague and Harrop 2007: 52). But the doctrine of absolute 
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sovereignty cannot object to this populist form of illiberal democracy either. For after all, the people did elect 
this populist. Furthermore, when the populist dictator proceeds to limit the freedom of speech, it is impossible to 
object that this is illegitimate. After all, popular sovereignty excludes constitutional limitations. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that there is a constitutional guarantee of liberty of speech which the dictator is violating. 
Similarly, it cannot be objected that the courts ought to be protecting constitutional liberties against the dictator, 
and striking down his policies as violations of the rights of the people, for there cannot be such constitutional 
liberties and rights according to the doctrine of absolute democratic sovereignty. Hague and Harrop (2007: 51), 
speaking of illiberal democracy in general, state that “[b]ecause the judiciary in an illiberal democracy is under-
resourced, it is unable to enforce the individual rights documented in the constitution.” But unlimited popular 
sovereignty cannot tolerate the enumeration of any individual rights to begin with. It is not merely that the courts 
cannot enforce rights, but instead, rights cannot be specified at all, for any such enumeration would supersede 
democracy and illegitimately constrain the sovereign popular will. There cannot be anything beyond the will of 
the people to which the courts can appeal. It is the will of the people which is sovereign above all else. And since 
the dictator represents the will of the people, no court – no matter how independent – can appeal to any 
normative principle above the dictator's will. If there were any such normative principle, then sovereignty would 
necessarily be located not in the will of the people but in that normative principle which has been placed above 
the will of the people.
Under democratic socialism as well, as long as democracy is conceived in this unlimited fashion, then 
there no normative principles to appeal to above the sovereign popular will. If the government owns the printing 
presses and imposes selective censorship, what principle can anyone appeal to against this? It is the will of the 
people which is sovereign, not any individual liberties or rights. Whether the majority votes to oppress the 
minority, or whether the people elect an authoritarian populist, there is no higher principle to which one can 
appeal to object to the government's policies. But then democratic socialism cannot promise to be any less 
despotic and tyrannical than non-democratic socialism. Distinguishing between “liberal democracy of the Anglo-
Saxon and Swiss kind on the one hand and the Jacobin brand of democracy on the other,” Wilhelm Röpke (1998 
[1957]: 66) notes that the latter precludes the “metademocratic” constitutional limits imposed by the former 
(Röpke 1998 [1957]: 68). Therefore, he says (Röpke 1998 [1957]: 69),
Democracy is, in the long run, compatible with freedom only on condition that all, or at least 
most, voters are agreed that certain supreme norms and principles of public life and economic 
order must remain outside the sphere of democratic decisions.
But democratic socialism necessarily rests on the illiberal principle that nothing is outside the sphere of 
democratic decisions.
The democratic socialists have unfortunately taken little notice of this problem. As Lavoie (1985a: 137) 
notes in his survey of their literature, “[i]n all these articles and books there is no coherent argument about why 
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we should expect the political changes implicit in national planning somehow not to lead to a drastic 
centralization of political and economic power. Instead, there is simply a strong emphasis on the virtues of 
democratic or local or collective decision-making.” By any conception of democracy, then, democratic socialism 
is incoherent. If democracy is a means to limit power, then it is incompatible with the unlimited power which 
socialism necessarily requires for its implementation. And if democracy is an end unto itself, constitutive of the 
good, then it cannot tolerate constitutional limits on democratic or socialist power which restrict the exercise of 
socialism or democracy in order to protect individual rights. If democracy is itself constitutive of the good, then 
illiberal outcomes of democracy must be accepted as necessarily good. In either case, democratic socialism is 
unable to promise that individual rights will be protected. 
2. What Happens in the Next Election?
There is one other crucial aspect of democracy which the democratic socialists appear to have neglected: 
that democracy entails periodic elections. We certainly cannot assume the democratic socialists will always win. 
So what happens if during the next election, the people vote against the incumbent party? Some capital 
investments take years or decades to bear fruit, before they deliver the hoped-for return-on-investment. What if 
four years after a plan is inaugurated, a new party is elected and uproots that tree before it has had a chance to 
blossom? How could any economic coherence or consistency be maintained if elections constantly upend the 
entire economy? For “[l]ong-term industrial projects cannot flourish in such an environment of political 
uncertainty,” according to Jewkes (1968: 166). 
And how could democratic socialism be maintained if the people voted against socialism and in favor of 
a free-market? Or what if the people continued to vote for socialism in general, but chose to elect a competing, 
alternative socialist party with a central plan differing from that of the incumbent socialist party? How can a 
long-term economic plan be maintained if it is replaced every time a new party comes to power? A colleague of 
Hayek's, a little-known economist named John Jewkes (1968: 166, 152, 166) argued,21
Even where one planning government is succeeded by another, sudden switches of policy are to 
be expected. . . . If the personnel of the supreme planning group changes, then disrupting and 
costly changes in policy will follow. Even greater dislocation is to be expected where a socialist 
government, committed to planning, is replaced by a non-socialist government which favours 
the free economy. So long as representative government is maintained this possibility cannot be 
ruled out. . . . The prospect is thus opened up of chaotic competition between rival plans. 
And so, said Jewkes (1968: 152, 166f.). , democratic socialism could not operate 
Unless . . . the highly undemocratic assumption is made that the government will never change 
the political colour of its government. . . . There is no escape from a dilemma unless one party is 
has the courage of its conviction and, in the interests of the continuity of its economic 
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programmes, deprives the electorate of the right to change the government.”
In fact, some of the advocates of democratic socialism themselves did not shy away from this anti-democratic 
conclusion. As Hayek (2007 [1944]: 105) noted:
to make it quite clear that a socialist government must not allow itself to be too fettered by 
democratic procedure, Professor Laski . . . raised the question “whether in a period of transition 
to Socialism, a Labour Government can risk the overthrow of its measures as a result of the next 
general election” - and left it significantly unanswered.
And further (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 105n4),
Professor Laski [expressed] his determination that parliamentary democracy must not be 
allowed to form an obstacle to the realization of socialism . . . “the continuance of parliamentary 
government would depend on its [i.e. the Labour government's] possession of guarantees from 
the Conservative Party that its work of transformation would not be disrupted by repeal in the 
event of its defeat at the polls”! 
The problem is especially severe for Michael Walzer (1978: 358, 2010) who, as we have seen, equates 
democratic socialism – or “socialism-in-the-making” – with the democratic process. What happens if the people 
vote for capitalism or laissez-faire? Or what if they vote for fascism? Is this still socialism? And we already saw 
that absolute, unlimited democracy allows the people to elect an authoritarian despot who is unencumbered by 
any constitutional restrictions on the exercise of his power. In general, the coherency and consistency of any 
socialist plan is threatened by unpredictable political changes, and democracy does nothing less than to 
institutionalize and systematize such unpredictability.
Robert A. Dahl's (1985) defense of workplace democracy suffers from a similar dilemma. As Mayer 
(2001: 230) notes, according to Dahl, “The fact that [non-democratic workplace management] is sanctioned 
today by majority rule and majority opinion is no justification, for moral rights cannot legitimately be suspended 
by a show of hands.” So apparently, democracy is to be the ruling concept, except when the people 
democratically reject democracy. Then democracy is invalid. The people must have democracy even they 
democratically declare that they do not want it (cf. Talmon 1960: 205, 236). The liberal conception – which we 
have discussed earlier – that democracy is subordinate to the protection of individual rights – and that popular 
sovereignty is not unlimited – is strangely invoked just once: if the people vote to reject unlimited popular 
sovereignty, then their vote is nugatory because the people have a right to unlimited sovereignty which they are 
not allowed to democratically reject. Heads, Dahl wins; tails, the people lose. 
These considerations suggest that any attempt to implement democratic socialism may wind up traveling 
back down the road paved by Robespierre's Terror during the French Revolution. Green (1986)'s review of 
Dahl's (1985) advocacy of compulsory workplace democracy is revealing: the reason “why historically men 
came to demand liberty, or limited government . . . was because centuries of experience had taught that 
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governments which set out to create the good life for their people ended up by forcing one conception of the 
good life on them.” As Jacob Talmon (1960) shows, the followers of Rousseau really did believe in individual 
liberty and human rights. The failure of the French Revolution had nothing to do with with a disregard for liberal 
individualism. Instead, Talmon argues, the problem was that the French philosophes assumed that there was one 
natural order which best accorded with human nature, and they were confident that this natural order was a self-
evident, Cartesian truth (cf. Hayek 1948: 1-32). Rousseau and Robespierre were sure that majoritarian 
democracy would unerringly result in a unanimous discovery and ratification of the General Will. Because the 
truth was so obvious, they simply could not conceive of the possibility that factions and disagreements might 
persist under democracy. When not everyone agreed with Robespierre on what the General Will was – and the 
truth was, remember, self-evident – the only conclusion he could draw was that some people were simply evil or 
stupid. In such a case, it was consistent with human rights and liberties to follow Rousseau's counsel to “force 
people to be free” – to force people to live in accordance with the self-evidently true and best lifestyle. The rest, 
of course, is history. 
Bryan Caplan (n.d. #1) shows that something similar happened to the anarchists during the Spanish Civil 
War: the anarchists were forced to resort to state-socialism to implement their scheme. But, says Caplan, this was 
not because the anarchists were insincere in their denunciations of state violence and compulsion. The anarchists 
really did mean everything they said when they rejected the Weberian state (Caplan n.d. #1; cf. Caplan n.d. #2 
s.v. “9. How would left-anarchy work?”). The problem was that they assumed that anarchism would successfully 
accomplish their socialist aims. But when they implemented workplace democracy, they discovered that some 
factories were materially furnished better than others. The workers in some factories thus obtained higher 
incomes than others (Caplan n.d. #1; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]: 238, 242). This was not what the anarchists 
envisioned. There were two solutions: either the anarchists could hold true to their anarchism and let things be, 
or else they could create a Weberian state and compel the richer factories to subsidize the incomes of the workers 
of the poorer factories. In the end, the anarchists took the second route, and their socialist aims prevailed over 
their anarchist means (Caplan n.d. #1). They had to create a state to redistribute incomes when their anarchist 
workplace democracy did not produce the outcomes which they had expected. 
Similarly, one wonders whether the democratic socialists have ever conceived of the possibility that they 
might actually lose an election!22 What will they do if the people vote for capitalism? Will the democratic 
socialists accept this democratic outcome, or will they insist that socialism must be implemented at all costs, 
even if this means abandoning democracy? Like the French philosophes, the democratic socialists have assumed 
that everyone will vote for what they believe they ought to. But when the people vote differently, what will the 
democratic socialists do? A democratic socialist cannot legitimately specify both the means of democracy and 
the end of socialism, for this is an illegitimate act of what Michael Novak (1986: 172) terms “definitional 
imperialism,” where one defines a given set of means as accomplishing a given set of ends.23 One may indeed 
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hypothesize that a given set of means will accomplish a given set of ends, but when it comes time to verify the 
hypothesis, one must make a choice: either means or ends. Either one implements democracy and discovers 
whether the hypothesis is verified – that is, whether the people indeed turn out to choose socialism as 
hypothesized – or else one decides upon socialism and then chooses to implement whichever means will 
successfully produce that given end, even if it turns out that those means are necessarily anti-democratic, 
contrary to the original hypothesis. So to pose the question again: if it turns out that the people will not vote for 
socialism, what will the democratic socialists choose? Will they choose non-socialist democracy or non-
democratic socialism? Will they simply become plain democrats, accepting whatever the people have willed, 
even if it has nothing to do with socialism? Or will they become Soviet-style socialists, relying on a vanguard 
party to implement the true General Will and compel the people to be free? Surely the people will thank them 
later . . . right? 
3. International Economic Integration: Where Goods Do Not Cross Borders, Armies Will
Our final reason for the incoherence of democratic socialism is the deleterious effects it would have on 
international relations. By virtue of its socialist nature, a thoroughgoing democratic socialism would seriously 
disrupt international trade and threaten peaceful foreign relations, possibly even giving rise to warfare, but 
certainly leading to tense relations. Insofar as democratic socialists strive for peace and the protection of human 
rights, these foreign policy consequences are incompatible with the goals of democratic socialism. In constrast to 
the vaunted “democratic peace theorem,” democratic socialism would in fact give rise to international conflict, 
in violation of democratic values.
This argument was made most clearly by Ludwig von Mises (1985 [1944], esp. ch. 3, pt. 4-10)24 and by 
Gustav Cassel (1934), but it is compatible with Hayek's analysis. Indeed, Hayek approvingly cites both Mises 
and Cassel (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 239f.).25 Focusing on the socialist attitude towards international commerce, 
Mises and Cassel argue that militancy, belligerency, and bellicosity are logical consequences of the consistent 
pursuit of socialism. Being a market-based activity, international trade is opposed to the values of socialism. As 
such foreign commerce is ideologically anathema, the truly socialist state is necessarily autarkic (Mises 1985 
[1944], Osterfeld 1992: 7).26 
Furthermore, foreign trade reduces national sovereignty by ceding economic power to the foreign 
trading partner (Mises 1985 [1944], Osterfeld 1992: 181f.). No government can exercise power beyond the 
territory subject to its own sovereignty. Imports must be paid for with exports, and purchasing imports requires 
producing goods for exports which satisfy foreigners. This means the government's domestic economic plan 
must satisfy the whims of fickle foreigners who are not subject to the government's sovereignty. 
Meanwhile, freedom of international trade allows foreign competition to undermine and defeat domestic 
intervention and regulation. Freedom of trade between two states limits the ability of the governments of either 
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one of those two states to intervene in their domestic economies. A government cannot successfully intervene in 
its domestic market unless it is insulated from foreign markets. For example, if a state wishes to boost domestic 
wages in a given industry by establishing minimum wages or legally privileging unions, then it must establish 
trade barriers to keep foreign states from undercutting those wages by offering cheaper goods. Contrariwise, 
when a state is unable to impose such barriers to trade, its ability to domestically intervene is limited because 
any attempt at domestic intervention will too quickly prove itself to be self-defeating. For example, when the 
state of Washington tried to legally favor unions, Boeing responded by voting with its feet and relocating to the 
“right to work” state of South Carolina. In such a case, it is too obvious that domestic intervention was 
responsible for undesirable consequences. But had Boeing been forbidden to vacate Washington, it would have 
been more difficult for voters to discern that legal regulations had artificially raised the cost of business. Trade 
restrictions are resorted to as a form of cost-concealment, a means by which foreigners are forbidden to expose 
the manner in which domestic interventionism has raised costs and reduced productivity.
Hence, where there is freedom of international trade, conditions in foreign markets will tend to 
undermine and disrupt the domestic central plan of the socialist state and expose it vacuousness. Where 
international trade is unrestricted, domestic intervention will too quickly prove self-defeating Therefore, under 
thoroughly consistent socialism, foreign trade must be limited if not entirely precluded so that the state can plan 
with confidence without its sovereignty being undermined. But if imports are banned, then the state must 
militarily conquer those territories which possess desired resources (Mises 1985 [1944], Cassel 1934). The 
logical consequence of such autarky is therefore militant expansionism. Hence, the Nazi pursuit of Lebensraum, 
“living space.” 
Lord Percy of Newcastle (1955) offered a similar analysis of this dynamic, arguing that absolute 
democracy – sovereignty of the popular will – leads to nationalism, which in turn restricts foreign relations. 
According to Percy (1955: 61), “the very idea of a constitution is essentially repugnant to the pure democrat.” 
Further,“a sovereign people must not allow its own decrees of yesterday to limit its freedom to meet the needs of 
today. . . . Thus the incompatibility of unmixed democracy with settled law” (Percy 1955: 50). Popular 
sovereignty cannot tolerate any limitations on its own democratic authority. But the General Will cannot easily 
be determined or expressed except at the local level (Percy 1955: 56, 62). One solution to this dilemma is 
nationalism (Percy 1955: 75-110). The sovereign people is united by a common nationality and the 
constitutionally unlimited General Will is expressed at the national level. But such nationalism quickly leads to a 
closed economic democracy which turns to belligerency and militarism. According to Percy (1955: 99f.),
[M]ost of the members of the new family of nations, created by the Peace of Versailles . . . 
existed, so the argument had run, because their peoples were entitled to sovereignty. If their 
governors could not find a way to be democratic nationalists, they were bound to try to assert 
themselves as economic nationalists. For the corporate franchises and the international dealings 
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of world capitalism are the most irritating possible challenges to the claim of a sovereign people 
to sole power within its own territory. An economic democracy must be a closed system; hence 
Marx's thesis that it could be established only in a World state as the result of an international 
revolution. ... Thus, to vary the metaphor, the best diagnosis of the convulsions of Europe 
between the wars is that they were the result of economic shock, operating on a constitution 
undermined by the peculiar religious mania of nationalism.
In short, both unlimited democracy and socialism lead to national socialism.. Neither unlimited democracy nor 
socialism nor nationalism can tolerate foreign interference in domestic economic planning nor can they allow 
diminution of domestic popular sovereignty. Therefore, insofar as they are followed consistently to their logical 
ends, they all lead to autarky, belligerency, and militarism. 
Woodrow Wilson was wrong: it is not true that democracies never go to war against each other simply 
because they are democracies. If anything, unlimited democracies will go to war more often because their 
nationalism demands economic autarky. If there is any nation which is less likely to go to war, it is those nations 
which permit international free-trade at the expense of popular or national sovereignty. The fact that Europe has 
been peaceful since World War II has less to do with democracy and more to do with the common market which 
has united Europe economically since 1957.27 This common market is certainly liberal but it is undemocratic 
insofar as it deprives domestic European states of complete democratic sovereignty. In other words, if 
democracies have in fact been less less likely to go to war, it is because they have tended to be liberal 
democracies where the liberal aspect operates as a limiting check on the democratic element (Hague and Harrop 
2007: 49). Liberal democracies have been unlikely to go to war because they have been more liberal than 
democratic.
These are some of the reasons Hayek argued in the Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) that German National 
Socialism was not a corruption or departure from socialism. Instead, the Nazis had merely pursued socialism to 
its logical conclusion. According to Hayek, the Nazis had simply been more willing than the German Social 
Democrats to use whatever means were necessary to implement socialism (Hayek 2007: 146, 160, 182). Lord 
Percy called the Germans “an insurgent people, claiming the 'right to work' in a territory sufficiently extended, 
and a State effectively socialized, for that purpose” (Percy 1955: 103; cf. 105). 
We can summarize this extended argument with the Manchester School's aphorism that “Where goods 
do not cross borders, armies will.” Domestic economic intervention cannot succeed without international 
isolation and restriction of trade. Foreigners cannot be allowed to undercut and circumvent domestic regulation. 
But this in turn leads to warfare. Thus, Nazi/Soviet military expansionism was merely a consequence of socialist 
economic policy pursued consistently to its final implications. At best, if warfare is avoided, then domestic 
interventionism leads to complete isolation and insularity; nearly all contact with foreigners must be restricted in 
order to safeguard the integrity of the domestic economic plan. Democratic socialism must restrict international 
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trade and foreign relations in order to ensure the effectiveness of the central plan and protect the people's 
democratic popular sovereignty. But this would give rise to consequences in foreign policy contrary to the 
cosmopolitan and humanitarian values of the democratic socialists. Democratic socialism is inconsistent with 
international multiculturalism, and it requires discriminating against foreigners – treating them as something 
other than one's fellow human beings possessing equal rights and dignity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have argued that democratic socialism is inconsistent with the protection of individual rights and 
liberties. None of these reasons rest on the argument that economic calculation is impossible under socialism; for 
the sake of argument, we could assume that Lange-Lerner-Taylor were correct and that Mises-Hayek were 
wrong, and we would still have to conclude that democratic socialism is impossible, in the sense that it cannot 
accomplish its purpose.
Democratic socialism is incoherent and self-defeating because democracy is merely a means to the end 
of limiting power, but socialism necessarily requires unlimited power. The means and the end are incompatible 
and one must be sacrificed to the other. This contradiction can be avoided by defining democracy instead as an 
end unto itself: the government should execute the will of the people simply because popular sovereignty defines 
the good. But this precludes the imposition or maintenance of any constitutional restraints on the exercise of 
government power, and it will result in totalitarian or illiberal democracy. Whether democracy is conceived as a 
means or as an end, either way, democratic socialism is inconsistent with limited government and guaranteed 
protection of the individual rights of minorities.
A second reason for the impossibility of democratic socialism is that its advocates have not sufficiently 
accounted for the possibility that they might lose an election. If the people vote for socialism, then well and 
good. But what if the people vote for capitalism? What then? In such a case, the democratic socialists can 
become either plain democrats – accepting the non-socialist outcome as good and acceptable simply because it is 
the will of the people – or else they can – like Robespierre following Rousseau – form a vanguard party and 
compel the people to be free. Either the democratic socialists must become plain democrats or else they must 
resort to Soviet-style command socialism.
Finally, democratic socialism or economic democracy is – like economic nationalism – incompatible 
with cosmopolitanism and international peace. Domestic interventionism cannot be sustained as long as imports 
are allowed undermine the plan. Thorough domestic interventionism is impossible without protectionism and 
national self-sufficiency. This in turn must result in either bellicosity, belligerency, and warfare, or else 
isolationism and complete disregard for foreigners. Either way, democratic socialism is therefore inconsistent 
with a philosophy which regards all human beings around the world as essentially equal in rights and dignity. 
The “democratic peace theorem” is not true – at least not in the form Woodrow Wilson conceived it. If 
24
democracies do not go to war, it is not because they are democratic, but it is because they agree to permit 
international free-trade. But democratic socialism would have to restrict foreign commerce, and so the 
democratic peace theorem would not apply.
Countless humanitarians have placed their hopes and dreams for a better future for mankind in 
socialism. But they soon realized that Soviet-style socialism inevitably produced a totalitarianism and a 
disregard for human happiness worse than anything capitalism had ever had. Therefore, many of these socialist 
humanitarians soon began to advocate democratic socialism instead – socialism with a human face. 
Unfortunately for them, democratic socialism can never function as they have hoped. Even if socialism were 
economically rational and feasible, a specifically democratic institutionalization of socialism is politically 
impossible, in the sense that democratic socialism cannot accomplish the goals and purposes set for it.
And we must reiterate these facts, for as we noted previously, those who do not learn from history are 
doomed to repeat it. We cannot assume that students born during the 21st century will have learned the lessons of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of actually existent socialism. We must understand these lessons 
ourselves and then painstakingly convey them to our pupils if history is not to repeat itself.
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McPhail, see Makovi (2016b). (I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Farrant and McPhail [2009]).
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9 Prychitko (1998) makes two criticisms of Burczak: first, Burczak's “thin” socialism might undesirably 
“thicken” into central planning due to the difficulty of defining the “whole product” to which labor is entitled, 
especially in an interconnected economy where many firms produce intermediate products to be embodied 
later in final consumer goods. Second, Prychitko says, Burczak's own principles converge on a free-market 
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392, 2011: 139-144), but this are economic issues beyond the scope of our political discussion. For a criticism 
of subsidized credit, see esp. Lavoie (1985a: 157-160, 173-210).
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13 Cf. Hayek's (1948: 186) criticism of Lange (1938)'s market socialism, taking notice of
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15 Denitch (1978)'s response to Heilbroner advocates guild socialism or syndicalism, and Heilbroner (1978b: 
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16 For further analysis of Orwell's views, see Makovi (2015, 2016a) and the sources cited therein, especially 
Roback (1985) and Crothers (1994).
17 Cf. Boettke and Leeson (2002: 12). As for why socialism “necessarily involves the use of power which 
cannot be guided by fixed rules,” see Hayek, “Planning and the Rule of Law,” in Hayek (2007 [1944]: 112-
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